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NOTES
PUNISHMENT OF A NARCOTIC ADDICT FOR CRIME OF
POSSESSION: EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1962 Lawrence Robinson was convicted in the Municipal Court
of Los Angeles for the crime of being addicted to narcotics.' The Supreme
Court of the United States in Robinson v. California2 reversed his con-
viction. The Court held that a statute making the status of drug addiction
a punishable criminal offense is unconstitutional as a "cruel and unusual"
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.'
The decision explicitly recognized that drug addiction is an illness.'
Although the Court, in dicta, indicated that a state through its police
power may control narcotics traffic by use of criminal sanctions for
possession of narcotics,5 it pointed out that the California statute did not
punish the possession of narcotics.' Subsequent lower court decisions
have refused to extend the Robinson rationale to the crime of possession.'
This note considers the question of whether the imposition of criminal
punishment for possession of narcotics by an addict for personal con-
sumption is unconstitutional as a "cruel and unusual punishment."
The term "narcotic drugs" as used herein refers to the definition
adopted by the Federal government.8 Included in the government's
definition are opium, isonipecaine, cocoa leaves, opiates and the natural
and synthetic derivatives of these drugs.9 The following discussion,
however, does not deal with the separate medico-legal problems presented
by marihuana.
THE DRUG ADDICTION PROBLEM
A widely accepted definition of drug addiction has been propounded
by the World Health Organization:
Drug addiction is a state of periodic and chronic intoxication
1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1964).
2. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
3. Id. at 666.
4. Id. at 667.
5. Id. at 664.
6. Id. at 666.
7. See notes 119-29 infra and accompanying text.
8. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 4731.
9. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 4731.
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detrimental to the individual and to society, produced by the
repeated consumption of a drug (natural or synthetic)."0
The World Health Organization recognizes three major characteristics
of narcotics addiction: first, an overpowering desire and need to continue
taking the drug; secondly, a tendency to increase the dosage; and
thirdly, a psychological, and usually physical, dependence upon the drug."
These characteristics indicate that narcotics addiction is an illness al-
though its extent and overall psychological implications are not yet fully
understood.' 2
It has been asserted that addiction cannot be cured by use of
traditional punitive-oriented methods.'" This assertion is supported by
the high relapse rate of addicts who have been "cured" of physical
dependence on drugs. 4 An understanding of the high relapse rate
requires a consideration of the peculiar syndrome called "withdrawal."
The term "withdrawal" refers to the "physical and mental reactions that
the addict suffers when the dosages are due, but not available."' 5
The physical reactions may be treated with relative ease and physical
dependence ended. 6 Eradication of physical withdrawal reactions, how-
ever, does not end addiction. The mental reaction is not concurrently
cured; and the factors which initiated the use of drugs, whether psycho-
logical, environmental, or a combination of both, still exist.' Thus, the
physical "cure" may be little more than an interim between periods of
active addiction.'
10. M. Plascowe, Appendix A: Some Basic Problems in Drug Addiction and
Suggestions for Research, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? REPORTS OF A.B.A.-
A.M.A. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS 23 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Plascowe]. Drug addiction has also been defined as:
A state of psychic or physical dependence, or both, on a drug, arising in a
person following administration of that drug on a periodic or continuous basis.
Eddy, HALBACK, ISBELL & SEEVERS, DRUG ADDICTION: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND CE[AR-
AcTERISTICS, 722 (World Health Org. Bull. No. 32 1965). [hereinafter cited as EDDY].
While the exact characteristics of addiction will vary with the drug involved, the above
general characteristics apply to addiction from all drugs. Id.
11. EDDY 723; Plascowe 23; Cameron, Addiction--Current Issues, 120 Am. J.
PSYCHIAT. 313 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Cameron].
12. Plascowe 34. Some experts contend that a narcotic addict's personality is
characterized as one having serious defects in development and often pathological
tendencies. This characterization has led to the theory that the psychological structure
of the individual, rather than the effect of the drug, determines the etiology of addic-
tion. See Raskin, Petty & Warren, A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Narcotic
Addiction 9 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric
Association, May 2, 1956) [hereinafter cited as Raskin[.
13. Plascowe 34.
14. Id. See Cantor, The Criminal Law and the Narcotics Problem, 51 J. CRim.
L. C. & P. S. 512, 524 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Cantor].
15. Cantor 523.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Addiction effects the addict's psychological balance and basic motiva-
tions. A sense of well-being or elation, greater than a person normally
experiences, often attracts the drug user in the early phases of his
addiction. 9 Later, as use continues, the addict must take drugs in order
to feel "normal" or free of tension.2° Interest in socially productive
work, food, sex, companionship and family ties is lost and the addict lives
mainly in the "euphoric glow of his last dose and in anticipation of the
next one."'" The need for drugs replaces traditional values and the
addict's primary activity and aim in life centers around the search for
drugs.22 The dominant clinical description of the addict is helplessness-
"an insinuating, insidious, inexorable helplessness to deal with his
addiction by himself."2
Although it has been contended that there is no "typical" addict, 4
there is a statistically "typical" addict. He lives in a metropolitan area,25
22
is unmarried,"6 is under forty years of age,2 is a member of a minority
group"8 and comes from a low socio-economic level. 9 In a geographical
breakdown (as of December 31, 1966) of the estimated 60,000 narcotic
19. Raskin 9.
The initial use of the drug produces an incomparable sense of well-being,
self-sufficiency, and security. The memory of this experience beckons as a
panacea for all the unbearable frustrations of daily living.
Id.
20. Murray, Psychology and the Drug Addict, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 98, 99 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Murray].
21. Ausubel, Controversial Issues in the Management of Drug Addiction: Lega-
lization, Ambulatory Treatment and the British System 5 (paper read at the con-
vention of the American Psychological Association, September 4, 1959) [hereinafter
cited as Ausubel].
22. Winick, Narcotics Addiction and its Treatment, 22 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB.
9, 14 (1957).
23. Raskin 8.
24. Narcotics Addiction and its Treatment, supra note 22, at 11.
25. Murray 98.
26. Id.
27. Testimony of Commissioner of Narcotics Giordano, Extracts From Treasury-
Post Office Department and Executive Office Appropriation for 1968, Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriation, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
404-485, 463 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The following table indicates the
composition of the addict population according to age.
Age Groups .965 r966
Under 21 3.6* 3.4
21-30 47.0 46.5
31-40 38.0 37.7
Over 40 11.4 12.4
* numbers represent per cent of reported addicts.
Id.
28. Id. In 1966 the Negro minority represented 50.4 per cent of the number of
addicts reported. At one time this minority group composed 62 per cent of the known
addicts. Other minority groups are: Mexican, 5.4 per cent; Puerto Rican, 13.6 per cent.
Id. at 419.
29. Murray 98.
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addicts in the United States,"0 New York state has 52.2 per cent;
California has 12.1 per cent; Illinois has 11.6 per cent; and the remain-
ing 24.1 per cent is distributed among the other states."'
EXISTING STATUATORY FRAMEWORK
Philosophy of Narcotics Laws
Existing narcotics laws are based on one of two approaches. One
view, the punitive approach, argues that the solution to the narcotics
problem is to impose severe penalities for violation of both federal and
state narcotics statutes." This approach recognizes no exceptions to the
penal provisions in the case of the narcotic addict. This result is justified
on the grounds that long incarceration is needed to reduce the criminality
caused by the addict," provide deterrence, 4 and reduce the illicit
30. Hearings 418.
31. Id. at 417.
32. Ausubel 7.
33. Note, Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L. J. 751, 778 (1953). It has been estimated
that an addict must spend between $50 and $250 a day to satisfy his addiction. King,
The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62
YALE L. J. 736, 748-49 (1953) [hereinafter cited as King]. A more conservative
estimate is that the addict spends between $55 and $70 a day on narcotics. Interview
with Charles G. Ward, District Superivsor, Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in Chicago,
October 18, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Interview]. The economic impact is increased
because the addict is usually from a low socio-economic level. See note 29 supfra and
accompanying text.
The addict often resorts to crime to raise the required amount of money. Coroso,
Legislative Solutions to Narcotic and Drug Addiction, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 98, 125 (1966).
These crimes are generally the non-violent type such as shoplifting, prostitution, mail
theft, forgery and confidence games. King 748-49. Addicts also engage in illicit peddling
of narcotics: forty per cent of the known traffickers are addicts. Hearings 455.
The adherents to the punitive approach further justify the imposition of severe
penalties by arguing that approximately 75 per cent of the addict population have
criminal predispositions. Inteview. The following facts of an arrest by the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics may give an insight into the basis for the punitive approach. The
subject was arrested after making five sales totaling $203 to an undercover agent. When
arrested, the suspect had 41 tablets of 2 grain morphine sulfate and 139 tablets of
dolphine in his possession. He also had $5500 in cash. The man was an addict and had
been one for fifteen years. He appraently had no other means of support than his
illicit narcotics activiites. Tennyson, Federal Narcotic-Law-Enforcement Policy in
Relation to Drug Addiction, 14 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. J. 639, 640 (1959) (article is a
speech delivered before the Division of Food Drug & Cosmetic Law of the A.B.A. at
Miami Beach on August 24, 1959) [hereinafter cited as Tennyson].
34. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics to the President 16,
February, 1956. According to one report the number of addicts in the United States has,
decreased sharply since the passage of the Harrison Act in 1914. Murray 100. Similarily.
the American Medical Association has reported:
The best evidence indicates that the incidence of addiction in the United
States has declined since the passage of the federal narcotics laws.
Summary and Recommendations of Report on Narcotics by the Council on Mental
Health of the American Medical Association (1956) in DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR
DISEASE? REPORTS OF THE A.B.A.-A.M.A. JOINT COMMITrE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS
169 (1961).
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traffic in narcotics,"5 and that these measures cannot be accomplished if
the addict is excepted from the penal provisions of narcotics laws. 6
The other approach, the non-punitive, stresses that the problem is
essentially a medical one." Most adherents to this approach suggest that
compulsory institutional treatment of addicts in a drug-free environment
is essential to a solution of the narcotics problem. They assert that treat-
ment can be accomplished more satisfactorily through mandatory hospital
commitment than by means of the punitive isystem which in effect makes
addiction a crime. 8 The non-punitive approach also emphasizes therapy
and rehabilitation. 9 Inherent in this approach is an exception in the
penal provisions of the narcotics laws for addicts to whom the criminal
law does not, and cannot, act as a deterrent.4 °
35. Tennyson 648. It is argued that incarceration of addicts will reduce the illicit
market for narcotics. Id. Imprisoning addicted peddlers will diminish the availability of
drugs. Hearings 411 (statement by Mr. Acheson, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Treasury). The elimination of small distributors will also, theoretically, cause the
major traffickers to disappear 'because they will have no one to work for them. Canary,
Two Views on the Federal Narcotics Law Problem, I-Suggestion to Facilitate
Apprehension and Conviction of Narcotic Law Violators, 4 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 114,
114-15 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Canary].
36. Narcotics Regulation, supra note 33, at 778. Such a distinction, it could be
argued, would merely be an incentive for peddlers to become addicts and thereby
theoretically be immune from punishment. Immunity in turn would tend to minimize
any value of deterrence and frustrate attempts to eradicate the illicit market.
37. Cantor 512. According to the non-punitive approach, there is a serious
question whether it is just to punish an addict for conduct over which he has, by
reason of his addiction, no control. Frankel, Narcotics Addiction, Criminal Responsi-
bility and Civil Commitment, Part I, 1966 U. UTAn L. REv. 581, 587-88. The A.B.A.-
A.M.A. Joint Committee on Narcotic Drugs has questioned whether it is "the drug or
the short-sighted social policy" which is responsible for the criminality of the narcotics
addict. Plascowe 50.
38. Ausubel 10.
39. Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Civil Commitment, Part I,
supra note 37, at 588.
40. Id. at 587-88. Deterrence presupposes rationality since it proceeds on the
assumption that the prospective criminal will feel that the severe penalties imposed if
he is apprehended will outweigh the rewards of the crime. Cantor 522. But when the
compulsion to obtain the drugs is so great that everything else is secondary, the
deterrence theory seems to have little effect. See notes 20-23 supra. Imprisonment
itself fails as a corrective measure since there are practically no facilities for treatment
of addicts in penal institutions beyond the forcible withdrawal from the drugs. As a
result, the narcotics addict comes out of prison with his basic problems unresolved.
Plascowe 85. The tensions, anxieties and personality problems which caused him to take
drugs initially are still with him. See notes 14-17 supra. He usually returns to the same
nvironmental setting which originally facilitated his use of drugs and he finds the same
friends who have the same basic interest in drugs. Under these circumstances, recidivism
is almost inevitable. Plascowe 85.
Those opposed to the punitive approach also contend that a legislative distinction
can be made to separate the addict and non-addict offenders without impairing enforce-
ment. Narcotics Regulation, supra note 33, at 783. This argument seems to be sup-
ported by the apparently successful California civil commitment statute and the recently
adopted Federal Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act.
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Types of Statutes
1. Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, adopted by most states," is a
statutory realization of the punitive approach. The Act is basically penal
and attempts strict control of all narcotics use and traffic.42 Enforcement
of the "unlawful possession" type of provision is typically within the
jurisdiction of the state rather than federal authorities.4" For this reason
"unlawful possession" convictions frequently involve section two of the
Uniform Act which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess,
have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, or
compound any narcotic drug, except as authorized in this act."
This provision of the Uniform Act has been interpreted to apply to the
possession of drugs which are to be used solely for personal consump-
tion.45 The rationale for such an interpretation is based on three
41. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virgiina, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Manuscript (June 1967) of Postscript to W.
ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 177-225 (1962).
42. Manak, The Narcotics Problem: Outlook for Reform, 12 BUFFALO L. Rv.
605,611 (1963).
43. Tennyson 640. The two substantive federal laws designed to halt illicit traffic
in narcotics are the Harrison Anti-narcotic Act, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 4701-36;
and the Narcotic Drug Import and Export Act (Jones-Miller Act), 21 U.S.C. §§
171-85 (1952). Under both acts unlawful possession of prohibited drugs raises a
presumption of a violation which may be deemed sufficient to convict unless rebutted
to the satisfaction of the jury. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4704 (a); 21 U.S.C. § 174
(1952). Some federal courts have been reluctant to strictly apply such presumptions and
have indicated that more than possession is needed for conviction. See Chavez v. United
States, 343 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1965) ; Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir.
1962) ; Lamento v. United States, 4 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1915) ; United States v. Wilson,
225 F. 82 (W. D. Tenn. 1915). The Circuit Court in Chavez reasoned:
[I] f once the presumption comes into operation, it can be rebutted only by proof
of legal importation or legal possession, the element of knowledge . . . has
been read out of the statute. It is just as if . . . possession is to be regarded,
in and of itself, as a violation of the statute, unless proved to have been
lawful. Yet this cannot be done.
343 F.2d at 89.
However, the majority of the courts have found a rational connection between
possession and a violation of the Harrison or Jones-Miller Act because the narcotics
laws so severely limit the amount in circulation. Brosman, The Statuatory Presumption,
5 TUL. L. REv. 178, 203-04 (1931). Due to the high percentage of convictions in these
cases, the conclusion could be drawn that the actual effect of the presumption is to make
the mere fact of possession itself criminal.
44. W. ELDRIDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 136 (1962).
45. See People v. King, 26 Ill. App. 2d 586, 193 N.E.2d 790 (1963); State v. Reed,
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arguments. First, if the legislature intended to limit punishable possession
it could have done so by describing the crime in terms of possession
"with intent to sell, administer, dispense, compound, etc." Instead, the
legislature adopted the unqualified term "possess.""6 Secondly, the Uni-
form Act specifically indicates that possession is legal only where author-
ized in the Act, and possession for personal consumption is not so author-
ized." Thirdly, punishment of possession for personal consumption is
necessary to fulfill the legislative intent of suppressing the illicit narcotics
traffic."
It should be noted that the penalties for possession of narcotics
under the Uniform Act are generally very severe and may range from
three "' to fifteen years5" for a first offense to as much as life imprison-
ment51 for repeated offenses.52
2. Cali fronia Addict Rehabilitation Program
Just as the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act is a statutory realization of
the punitive approach, the California Civil Commitment and Addict
Rehabilitation Act is a statutory counterpart of the non-punitive ap-
proach.5" California prohibits the unlawful possession of narcotics"
34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961) ; Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 125 S.E.2d
858 (1962).
46. State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 557, 170 A.2d 419, 421 (1961).
47. Id. at 557-58, 170 A.2d at 421.
48. Id. at 559, 170 A.2d at 421. An apparent refinement of this argument has been
put thusly: since the purpose of the act is to correct the evil of illegal traffic in
narcotics and since possession is an "elementary and necessary ingredient of such
traffic," possession of any type other than for medical treatment should be prohibited.
Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 125 S.E.2d 858 (1962).
49. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 197-217E, ch. 123, § 62 (1954, Supp. 1965).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4701-22 (1953, Supp. 1964).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 22-1 to-54 (1961, Supp. 1965). Other examples are:
Alabama, first offense, 2-10 years; second offense, 5-10 years; subsequent offense, 10-40
years. ALA. CODE tit. 22, §§ 232-58(20) (1940). Nebraska, first offense, 2-5 years;
second offense, 5-10 years; subsequent offense, 10-20 years. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-451
to -472 (1964). The federal Jones-Miller Act provides for a penalty of five to twenty
years imprisonment for a first offense; and ten to forty years imprisonment for second
and subsequent offenses. 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952). A person convicted under the Harri-
son Act could receive 2-10 years imprisonment for a first offense; 5-20 years for a
second offense; and 10-40 years for a subsequent offense. INT. R V. CODE of 1954, §§
7237-38.
52. Narcotics Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Cizil Commitment, Part I,
supra note 37, at 581.
53. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3000 (West 1966). The Federal Narcotic
Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1966) (Supp. II 1964), is
patterned after the California program. Hearings 461. Any addict who is convicted of a
crime against the United States is eligible for commitment unless he fits into one of five
categories involving serious or repeated offenses. The first category applies to a defen-
dant who is convicted of a crime of violence. 18 U. S. C. § 4251 (F) (1) (1966).
Secondly, an offender who is convicted of unlawfully importing or selling, or con-
spiring to import or sell a narcotic drug will be ineligible for commitment unless the
court determines that such sale was for the primary purpose of acquiring drugs for
et al.: Punishment of a Narcotic Addict for the Crime of Possession: Eigh
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and conviction for unlawful possession may result in imprisonment.5"
However, the Rehabilitation Act provides a program of civil commitment
and rehabilitation where the offender is an addict.58
Under the Rehabilitation Act, if it appears that a person convicted of
a crime in a municipal or justice court is addicted (or may be in imminent
danger of becoming addicted)5" the judge adjourns the proceedings or
suspends the imposition of sentence. The judge certifies the defendant
to the Superior Court" which conducts proceedings to ascertain if the
defendant is addicted.5" If the defendant is addicted, the Superior Court
judge will order commitment to the rehabilitation center; if not, the
defendant will be returned to the trial court for further criminal pro-
ceedings."0 These provisions, however, do not apply to persons convicted
of, or previously convicted of, certain serious crimes."' A further
personal use due to addiction. Id. at § 4251 (F) (2). Thirdly, a person against whom
there is pending a felony charge, or who is on parole, or whose sentence has not fully
been served is not eligible unless the authority which can return him to custody consents
to his treatment. Id. at § 4251 (F) (3). The fourth category is any person who has been
convicted of a felony charge (either state or federal) on two or more occassions. Id. at
§ 4251 (F) (4). Finally, a person who has been committed under the Federal Narcotic
Addict Rehabilitation Act or any state proceeding because of narcotics addiction on
three or more occassions is not eligible. Id. at § 4251 (F) (5).
If the court believes a person is addicted and is an eligible offender, it will place
him in the custody of the Attorney General who will examine the defendant to determine
if he is addicted and make an appropriate recommendation to the court. Id. at § 4252.
Unlike California, however, the defendant will not be committed unless there are
adequate facilities. Id. at § 4253. The commitment may be for an indeterminate period of
time not to exceed 10 years, and in any event not to exceed the maximum sentence that
could otherwise be imposed. A person may be conditionally released upon approval of the
Attorney General and will be under the supervision of the parole board while so released.
If he violates the provisions of his release he will be returned to custody and upon re-
commendation of the board, his release terminated. Id. at §§ 4253-55.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500 (West 1964).
55. A first offense will result in not less than two or more than ten years imprison-
ment. If a person is a second offender the imprisonment is not less than five years or
more than twenty years. Third and subsequent offenders may be sentenced fifteen
years to life imprisonment. Id.
56. The legislative intent in enacting the law was:
Addicts . . . shall be treated for such condition and its underlying causes,
and that such treatment shall be carried out for nonpunitive purposes....
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3000 (West 1966).
57. The phrase "or in imminent danger of becoming addicted" is used in con-
nection with addiction throughout the statute but is ommitted in subsequent discussion
herein.
58. CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE 3050 (West 1966).
59. Id.
60. Id. The proceedings under which an addict is committed are analagous to
legal proceedings for the mentally ill: the defendant must be examined by medical
experts; he may produce witnesses on his own behalf; and must have counsel, hired
or court-appointed, during the proceedings. Wood, The Civil Narcotics Program: A
Five Year Progress Report, 2 LINc. L. REV. 114, 117 (1966). [hereinafter cited as
Wood].
61. These crimes are murder, assault with intent to commit murder, kidnapping,
robbery, burglary in the first degree, mayhem, any felony involving bodily harm or
attempt to inflict bodily harm, or any offense for which the minimum term prescribed by
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1968], Art. 5
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exclusionary provision62 allows the Director of Corrections to remit for
further criminal proceedings any person who is not a "fit subject" for con-
finement and treatment.6" Once commitment is effected, the addict
remains in the facility for at least six months as an inpatient.6 4 After a
period of inpatient status, usually fourteen months, the individual is
released as an outpatient.6 5
An integral part of the rehabilitation program is the provision for
"half-way" houses to return the former addict into the community as a
responsible person.66 The half-way house helps bridge the gap between
institutional living and the responsibility of full freedom in the com-
munity.6 7 Control and guidance are provided during the critical first
stage of transition to community living. Also, intensive counseling can
be given to those who are making only a marginal adjustment as an
outpatient.6" Whenever it is determined that an outpatient has abstained
from the use of narcotics for at least three consecutive years and other-
wise complied with the conditions of his release, the Director will recom-
mend discharge of the person from the program."0
As of mid-1967 only 699 cases, or about ten per cent of those
committed, have been returned to court.71 Those returned generally fall
within two categories: excessive criminality, and commercial sales of
narcotics where the sales activity exceeds the amount necessary to support
the habit of the individual."
law is more than five years in the state prison. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3052
(West 1966).
62. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3053 (West 1966).
63. Id. The courts apparently have a liberal discretion to decide upon the com-
mitment of an individual. For example, if a defendant is convicted of a narcotics charge
while on parole, the commitment order may be revoked and the defendant returned to
regular prison, regardless of his addiction. People v. Corona, 238 Cal. App. 2d 914, 48
Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965).
Conviction on a narcotics charge, even if the sentence is replaced by commitment,
constitutes a prior conviction in determining eligibility for commitment. People v.
McCuiston, 55 Cal. Rptr. 482 (App. Ct. 1966).
64. Wood 118.
65. Id.
66. CAL. WELF. INST'NS CODE § 3153 (West 1966).
67. Wood 126.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 3200 (West 1966). If a person has not been
discharged from the program at the expiration of seven years, he will be referred to the
court from which he was certified for further criminal proceedings. Id. at § 3201. If,
however, it appears to the Director that the patient could abstain from the use of
narcotics for three consecutive years, the court, upon recommendation of the Director,
may extend the commitment for a maximum period of three years. Id. Thus, the longest
a person may be kept in the program is ten years.
71. Wood 127.
72. Id. at 128-29.
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ROBINSON V. CALIFORNIA
Pre-Robinson Treatment of Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment originally
appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1688 and was subsequently
incorporated into the United States Constitution in 1791 as part of the
Eighth Amendment."' The historical basis of the prohibition in the Uni-
ted States rests on the often barbaric punishment meted out by the English
criminal law: burning, branding, torture, disembowlment, etc.74 Although
the exact scope of the prohibition has been questioned,"3 it is generally
interpreted to prohibit not only inhumane methods of punishment but also
punishment disproportionate to the crime." The classic example of the
latter interpretation is Weems v. United States." There the Supreme
Court declared a sentence of fifteen years at "hard and painful" labor so
disproportionate to the crime of falsifying a public document as to con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment within the Constitutional pro-
hibition.78
The instances of cruel and unusual punishment are decided on a
case-by-case basis, applying concepts of humanity and decency. 9 Until
recently, however, the doctrine has been restricted to inhumane or
disproportionate punishment.
The Robinson Decision
Robinson v. California0 marks a substantial departure from the
established concept of cruel and unusual punishment. In Robinson the
Court based its decision on the fact of imprisonment as being cruel and
unusual rather than the nature of the imprisonment or punishment.8
Robinson was convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles of
being addicted to narcotics. There was little or no evidence that defendant
had used or possessed narcotics while in the state of California, but his
arm had several needle marks and he confessed to occasional use of
73. Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 846 (1964).
74. Id. at 847.
75. See generally The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 73, at 847; Note, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 635, 646 (1966).
76. The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment, surpa note 73, at 847.
77. 271 U.S. 349 (1910).
78. Id. at 372.
Most states have adopted statutes similar to the Federal Constitution. The Effective-
ness of the Eighth Amendment, supra note 73, at 847, n.7.
79. The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment, supra note 73, at 850.
80. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
81. Id. at 667.
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drugs.82 The trial judge instructed the jury that they could convict if
they believed either that defendant used narcotics in Los Angeles or that
defendant was addicted to narcotics while in the county.8" The jury re-
turned a verdict of guilty and Robinson appealed to the County Superior
Court which affirmed the conviction.84 The Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction because the case "squarely" presented the issue of whether the
statute as construed by the Calfiornia courts was repugnant to the
Constitution.8"
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, held that drug addic-
tion is an illness 8 and cannot be made the subject of criminal sanctions.8 7
The probhibition against such punishment arises from the concept of
punishing a person for the "crime" of being afflicted with a disease :88
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract,
a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question
cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison
would be cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of
having a common cold."
The Court equated punishment of an addict to punishment of a person
who is mentally ill, a leper, or a person afflicted with a venereal disease;
none of which would be constitutionally valid."0 It should be noted that
the Court recognized the "vicious evils of narcotics traffic"'" and indicat-
ed that a state could regulate such traffic by means of laws regulating
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of drugs. 2
The majority opinion and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas relied on two major factors. The first is that the defendant could
have been convicted on the mere 'showing of addiction." In fact, the trial
judge's instructions, subsequently affirmed by the state appellate court,
specifically stated that the appellant need not have used narcotics while in
California, as long as he was addicted while in the state." Secondly, the
Court mentioned the involuntary nature of addiction and that it may be
contracted innocently or involuntarily,9 creating the possibility of a con-
82. Id. at 662.
83. Id. at 664.
84. 368 U.S. 918 (1961).
85. 370 U.S. at 664.
86. Id. at 667.
87. Id.
88. Id. See also Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, 370 U.S. at 676.
89. 370 U.S. at 667.
90. Id. at 666.
91. Id. at 667.
92. Id. at 664.
93. Id. at 667.
94. Id.
95. Id.; Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion at 670-74.
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viction without an initial voluntary act by the defendant.
Mr. Justice Clark dissented on two grounds. He asserted that the
statute under which Robinson was convicted applied only to the incipient
narcotic addict who still retained self-control. 6 California, Mr. Justice
Clark argued, has a civil commitment statute applicable to drug users
who have lost the power of self-control." Since Robinson was convicted
under the criminal statute and, according to his own testimony, retained
volitional control of his drug use, there is no reason why he should not
be punished for his anti-social behavior. To Mr. Justice Clark, such
punishment does not violate the "concept of ordered liberty" to which the
states must adhere.9" Secondly, Mr. Justice Clark asserted that the pro-
vision for three to twelve months confinement is not unreasonable when
compared with the provision for three to twenty-four months confinement
under the civil commitment statute. 99
While agreeing with Justice Clark,1"' Mr. Justice White dissented
on the additional ground that Robinson was actually convicted of using
narcotics rather than of occupying the "status" of being addicted. 1'
California's addiction statute, he argued, merely relieved the prosecutor
from the venue requirements of alleging and proving the county in which
the use of narcotics took place.02 Mr. Justice White also feared that the
majority's opinion could be extended to the use of narcotics which he felt
may be regulated.'0 3
Interpretation of Robinson
The crime of addiction and the crime of possession of narcotics are
distinct entities. Addiction involves the condition or status of being
addicted to drugs. Possession, on the other hand, is the act of having
illicit drugs on one's person. Unlike addiction, the crime of possession
may be committed by either an addict or a non-addict. The constitution-
ality of the crime of possession as applied to addicts was not decided by
the Robinson decision, nor has the decision been extended by other courts
to include possession.' One possible explanation of this hesitancy to
extend Robinson is that the underlying rationale of the case is unclear.
Several interpretations have been suggested.
96. 370 U.S. at 681.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 683-84.
99. Id. at 685.
100. Id. at 687.
101. Id. at 686.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 689.
104. See notes 119-28 infra and accompanying text.
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1. Involuntary First Act.
It has been suggested that the Robinson decision was based upon the
fact that the illness of narcotics addiction may be contracted innocently or
involuntarily.' Under this interpretation, the validity of punishment
turns on whether the individual became addicted voluntarily or involun-
tarily. This distinction has little support in the facts of the case. Although
it is one of the considerations mentioned by the Court, °6 Robinson was
not of the class of persons who involuntarily or innocently became
addicted. Moreover, such a rationale has no relevance to the majority of
addiction cases °7 and would not justify the Court's sweeping language
prohibiting punishment for addiction.
2. Involuntary Act
Another possible interpretation of Robinson is that any act which is
involuntary because of an illness cannot be punished. Perhaps the earliest
recognition of such a theory appeared in State v. Pike'°8 where defendant
was charged with murder. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
if defendant could prove that alcoholism was a disease and that the crime
was a product of the disease, he could not be held criminally responsible.
Judge Doe, in his concurring opinion, enunciated the rationale of the
involuntary approach:
[W]hen disease is the propelling, uncontrollable power, the
man is as innocent as the weapon. . . . If his mental, moral,
and bodily strength is subjugated and pressed to involuntary
service, it is immaterial whether it is done by his disease, or
by another man, or a brute or any physical force of art or
nature set in operation without any fault on his part.0 9
Apparently, Mr. Justice Fortas recognized this theory in his dissent-
ing opinion from the denial of certiorari in Budd v. California... where
he states :
Our morality does not permit us to punish for illness. We do
not impose punishment for involuntary conduct, whether the
lack of volition results from insanity, addiction to narcotics or
other illness. The use of the crude and formidable weapon of
105. Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 646 (1966).
106. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
107. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, supra note 105, at 649.
108. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
109. Id. at 441.
110. 385 U.S. 909 (1967).
et al.: Punishment of a Narcotic Addict for the Crime of Possession: Eigh
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1968
PUNISHMENT OF A NARCOTIC ADDICT
criminal punishment . . . is neither seemly nor sensible, neither
purposeful nor civilized. This Court should determine whether
it is constitutionally permissible, or whether . . . it is cruel and
unusual punishment-punishment in the absence of volitional
fault, punishment which our constitution forbids.11'
In Freeman v. United States". the defendant raised the defense of
involuntary conduct caused by narcotics addiction. The defendant, an
addict (and apparently under the influence of narcotics at the time of the
prohibited act), was convicted of selling narcotics to an undercover agent.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded. The court
held that a person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the
time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. In reaching its deci-
sion, the court stated:
Those who are substantially unable to restrain their conduct are,
by definition, undeterable and their punishment is no example
for others: those who are unaware of or do not appreciate the
nature and quality of their actions can hardly be expected ration-
ally to weigh the consequences of their conduct." 3
It would seem, then, that Freeman supports the involuntary theory
as applied to crimes committed under the influence of narcotics addiction.
Other language of the court, however, specifically negates such an
interpretation:
[W]e wish to make it absolutely clear that mere recidivism
or narcotics addiction will not of themselves justify acquittal
under the American Law Institute standards which we adopt
today.1 1
4
The court went on to say that narcotics addiction could not, without
more, be the "sole evidence" of abnormality." 5 This indicates that the
court relied on Freeman's underlying mental defects, rather than his
narcotics addiction, in reversing his conviction. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia went even further in repudiating
the non-responsibility doctrine. The court said that narcotics addiction
alone does not constitute even "some evidence" of mental disease so as
111. Id. at 910.
112. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
113. Id. at 615.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 625.
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to raise the issue of criminal responsibility."'
Even if the involuntary theory was the underlying rationale of
Robinson, certain problems arise in extending it to possession of narcotics.
When is an addict's behavior involuntary? Assuming that an addict's
illness may be divided into three periods; under the influence of drugs,
interim period between drug intoxication and withdrawal, and with-
drawal reactions, during which period or periods is possession involun-
tary? It could be argued that the addict acts involuntarily only while
under the influence of drugs and when experiencing withdrawal symp-
toms. During the former period his possession is similar to the acts of a
person who is mentally ill or involuntarily intoxicated. During the latter
period the addict is under a compulsion to use the drugs to overcome the
severe symptoms of withdrawal, which use of course would require
possession. During the interim period, however, it could be argued that
the addict is acting with rationality in possessing drugs. He is suffering
from neither drug intoxication nor the compulsion of staving off with-
drawal symptoms. Since he is under no addictive influence, his conduct
is voluntary and he should be punished fully for possession during that
period.
Such an argument, however, seems to overlook the nature of
narcotics addiction. An addict's entire life is centered around the search
for drugs." 7 When he is not under the influence of drugs, the need to
once again escape reality and the fear of withdrawal symptoms requires
him to seek drugs. When he acquires and has possession of them he is
acting under a compulsion to retain the drugs for his next "fix." The
interim between drug intoxication and withdrawal is the only time during
which an addict is able to obtain his needed drugs. Clearly when he is
intoxicated, he is not capable of securing them. Likewise, the reason for
taking drugs is to avoid withdrawal and it is unreasonable to assume
that an addict will wait until he is experiencing such symptoms to obtain
and have possession of drugs.
Secondly, the distinction between the time periods is impractical.
Enforcement officials could make an arrest in-mediately after intoxication
if there is any residual amount of drugs still remaining in the addict's
116. Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A sharp dissent
was filed in the case by Judge Wright who contended that the appellant had presented
evidence of an underlying mental illness which had been irritated by the prolonged use of
narcotics. Id. at 47. The difference of opinion on the court was not on whether narcotics
addiction was a mental illness, but rather the judges disagreed on whether narcotics
addiction was an outward manifestation of a mental disease and whether there was
sufficient evidence of mental defect to present the issue to the jury. The opinion seems
consistent with the theory that addicts have certain underlying psychological disorders.
See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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possession; or just before an addict begins to experience withdrawal
symptoms. Thus, the involuntary theory could be circumvented and be
ineffectual because never applicable.
3. Pure Status
The "pure status""' rationale of Robinson rests upon a distinction
between a status and an act: Robinson prohibited punishment for the
former but not the latter. This distinction has been adopted by most of
the courts interpreting the Robinson decision.11 The applicability of
this distinction in the context of possession of narcotics by an addict has
been considered in a number of cases. In People v. Nettles,"' the defen-
dant was convicted of the crime of unlawfully possessing narcotics and
was sentenced to the Illinois penitentiary for a period of not less than
five nor more than twenty-five years. The police had been informed that
defendant was selling narcotics. The arresting officers, however, were un-
able to find any proof of such a crime and merely arrested him for posses-
sion. Nettles, an addict and prior offender, asserted Robinson as a de-
fense. 1' The Illinois court rejected this defense and recognized a distinc-
tion between a status and an act.
[Robinson] .. . did not exclude addicts from the provisions
of the statute as defendant's contentions would propose, but
only held invalid a penal law which involved no voluntary act. 2'
In California the issue arose in People v. Zapata". where the
defendant was convicted of possession of heroin. Zapata, an addict for
three years, was denied rehabilitation because of criminal tendencies." 4
The court held that Robinson. was aimed at status rather than conduct.
Rejecting the contention that Robinson excludes punishment where there
is a compulsive craving which smothers freedom of will, the court stated
that the real reason for invoking the constitutional ban in Robinson was
the absence of any conduct at all."' The court went on to say:
We neither expand or limit Robinson, we merely follow it.
By imprisoning Zapata for possession, the state is penalizing
his act, not his craving. Public policy may call for a different
approach, the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punish-
118. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, supra note 105, at 646.
119. Id. at 650; Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility and Civil Commit-
ment, Part I, supra note 37, at 590.
120. 34 Ill. 2d 52, 213 N.E.2d 536 (1966).
121. Id. at 56, 213 N.E.2d at 538.
122. Id.
123. 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963).
124. Id. at 177.
125. Id. at 179.
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ment does not.'26
Perhaps the shortest renunciation of any extension of Robinson to the
crime of possession is contained in Castle v. United States.' There the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia merely said that the
argument "would have to be made to the Supreme Court" and affirmed
defendant's conviction. 8
DRIVER RATIONALE
The Driver Decision
Joe Driver was convicted in a North Carolina court for the crime of
"public drunkenness."' 2 9 He was 59 years old. His first conviction for
public intoxication occurred at the age of 24."' Since that time he was
convicted of the same offense more than 200 times resulting in his being
incarcerated for nearly two-thirds of his life.' Driver's appeals in the
state courts failed." 2 He thereupon filed a habeas corpus petition in the
federal district court. The petition was denied.' Driver appealed to the
federal circuit court on the grounds that punishment of an alcoholic for
public intoxication constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The circuit
court agreed and reversed his conviction. 4
The Driver decision is based on three grounds. Initially, the court
stated that an alcoholic cannot be punished for the crime of public drunk-
ness because his conduct was "neither actuated by an evil intent nor accom-
panied with a consciousness of wrongdoing" which are indispensable
ingredients of a crime.' 2 Thus, the alcoholic lacks what is referred to
as the "criminal mind."'3 6 Secondly, the misbehavior cannot be punished
as a violation of a police regulation-malum prohibitum-necessitating
no intent, because the alcoholic's drunken presence in public is not his act
for he did not will it.'" 7 In this respect the court likened the alcoholic's
movements to those of an imbecile or a person in the delerium of a
fever. ' 8 The court asserted that its decision did not contravene the
126. Id. at 174; See also State v. Reed, 34 N.J. 554, 170 A.2d 419 (1961)
Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 125 S.E.2d 858 (1962).
127. 348 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
128. Id. at 495.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1960).
130. 356 F.2d 763 (1966).
131. Id.
132. 262 N.C. 92, 136 N.E.2d 208 (1964).
133. 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965)
134. 356 F.2d at 765.
135. Id. at 764.
136. 361 F.2d 50, 52 (1966).
137. 356 F.2d at 764.
138. Id.
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familiar thesis that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime."'
Although a chronic alcoholic originally drank voluntarily, he does not
do so now because his excess derives from his illness. " "
The Driver decision did not, however, excuse the alcoholic from all
criminal responsibility. Rather, the third, and probably most far reaching,
ground for the decision is that, on the basis of Robinson, a state cannot
punish acts which are compulsive as symptomatic of a disease:
However, our excusal of the chronic alcoholic from criminal
prosecution is confined exclusively to those acts on his part
which are compulsive as symptomatic of the disease. 1 '
The court's reliance upon Robinson was clearly enunciated:
Robinson v. State of California ... sustains, if not commands,
the view we take .... The California statute criminally punished
a status-drug addiction . . . the North Carolina act crimin-
ally punished an involuntary symptom of a status-public in-
toxication. In declaring the former violative of the Eighth
Amendment, we think pari ratione the Robinson decision con-
demns the North Carolina law when applied to one in the
circumstances of appellant Driver.142
The Driver decision suggests a fourth rationale for the Robinson
case. That is, compulsive conduct resulting from a disease cannot be
criminally punished. Such a theory, however, is limited to acts which are
compulsive as symptomatic of a disease rather than all acts having some
connection with the disease.
The Driver decision was severely weakened, if not overruled, in
precedent value by Powell v. Texas... decided on June 17, 1968. In Pow-
ell, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an "alcholic" for public
drunkeness. Justice Marshall, in writing the majority opionion, however,
relied substantially on the controvrsy over whether alcholism is addictive
or even a disease. Also, the particular facts of the case gave rise to con-
siderable doubt as to whether Mr. Powell was indeed a chronic alcholic.
In part III of his opionion, which can arguably be considered dicta,
Justice Marshall attacks the "compulsive as symptomatic" rationale of
Driver, indicating that such a doctrine cannot be said to follow from
Robinson. However, Mr. Justice Marshall then goes on to say that the
"most troubling aspects" of extending Robinson to the Powell situation
139. Id. at 764.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 764-65.
143. 36 LW 4619 (1968).
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would be the scope and content of the resulting doctrine, especially where
the accused, as in Powell, is not determined conclusively to be a chronic
alcoholic. Also, even if Powell were an alcoholic, Justice Marshall has
doubts whether such an affliction results in an irresistable compulsion
to drink excessively in public."' It should be noted that five other
justices disagree with Justice Marshall's view that the "symptomatic"
test does not follow from the Robinson decision." 5
Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion supports the assertion that
the basic of the decision is the uncertain nature of alcoholism. Justice
White concurred only in the result of the case; and then only because the
facts did not show that Powell lacked all control over drinking. Had the
facts shown that appellant indeed had no control over either his compulsion
to drink or his being in public when intoxicated, Justice White implies
he may have felt differently about his decision to affirm. Thus, although
the Powell decision severely restricts the precedent value of Driver, the
persuasiveness of the reasoning in Driver still seems valid, especially
when applied to an addict whose use of narcotics is recognized as com-
pulsive. Consequently, it is submitted that the application of Driver to
possession of narcotics by an addict remains unimpaired by the Powell
decision.
Application of Driver to Possession
The "compulsive act" rationale of Robinson as enunciated in the
reasoning of Driver appears to be applicable to cases of possession of
narcotics by an addict for personal consumption. Addiction to narcotics
compels the addict to use those drugs which will ,satisfy his irresistable
craving. The use of drugs is not only a characteristic (symptom) of the
disease, but is the substance of the disease."' In order to use drugs, the
addict must, at some point in time, have possession of them. Thus,
possession is an act which is compulsive because of a characteristic of the
disease. Such possession is not only an act compulsive as symptomatic
of the disease but, indeed, it is an act essential.4 to the continuation of
the disease (continuation which the addict cannot voluntarily cease). The
possession of narcotics by an addict for personal consumption is even
more symptomatic of the disease of narcotics, addiction than public
intoxication is of alcoholism. Public drunkenness is not absolutely necess-
ary to the continuation of alcoholism while possession of narcotics is
absolutely necessary to the continuation of narcotics addiction." 6
144. Id. at 4621.
145. Justices White, Fortas, Douglas, Brennar and Stewart.
146. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
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Limiting Driver to Alcoholics
Several arguments might be made that the Driver rationale should
be confined to alcholics and not extended to addicts and the crime of
possession. One such argument is that the crime of possession of narcotics
(and narcotics addiction in general) presents a greater social evil than does
public drunkenness. Illegal possession of narcotics is physical evidence of
the vast illicit market which presents a real danger to society in terms of
anti-social behavior. Such behavior is manifested through the profits
accruing to organized crime from the sale of drugs and the criminality of
the addict in order to obtain money to buy drugs.14  Also, legislatures
have recognized the danger of possession of narcotics by passing laws
which impose severe penalties for such possession. 48
It is submitted, however, that punishment of the addict who cannot
control his possession is not essential to the eradication of the social
evils discussed above. The means to achieve such an end is civil com-
mitment of the addict offender. Both Robinson and Driver explicitly
recognized the power of a state to civily commit addicted persons.4 9
Civil commitment serves a twofold purpose: it removes the addict from
circulation, thereby reducing the addict population and illicit traffic in
the black market; and secondly, there is an attempt to rehabilitate the
addict and eventually release him as a productive member of society.
Thus, rather than being removed from active addiction only temporarily
through imprisonment, the addict could be permanently rehabiliated and
consequently permanently removed from the illicit market.
A further limiting argument is that the Driver decision was aimed
specifically at ending the "revolving door" type of case. The problem of
an alcoholic being in and out of jail constantly is a well-recognized social
evil. Mr. Driver was an example of such a situation, since he had been
arrested for public intoxication 200 times."2 On the other hand, incarcera-
tion of an addict for possession is not commonly recognized as an evil. The
"revolving door" situation and the resultant burden on the courts is inap-
plicable to the addict. Therefore, the reasoning of Driver should not be
extended to the crime of possession of narcotics.
147. Note, Criminal Law-Narcotics-Criminal Prosecution for Addiction is a
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Violating Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 16 VAND.
L. REv. 214, 218-19 (1962).
148. The Driver-Easter rationale would seem to negate or at least severely
weaken those cases which have distinguished between the status of addiction and the act
of posesssion in holding an addict criminally punishable for possession of narcotics for
personal consumption. See, e.g., notes 107-28 supra and accompanying text.
149. See note 33 supra.
150. See notes 48-52 supra.
151. 356 F.2d at 765; 370 U.S. at 665.
152. 356 F.2d at 764.
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It is submitted, however, that incarceration of an addict is not
recognized as an evil only because of a lack of public knowledge that
addiction is a disease. Furthermore, the only reason the addict does not
fit the "revolving door" category is that he is incarcerated for several
years for each offense rather than a few days or weeks. When the addict
is sentenced to anywhere from three years to life imprisonment,"5'
he can hardly be in and out of jail 200 times during his life. He may very
well, however, be incarcerated for two-thirds of his life.
A further limiting consideration is that Driver was based on an act
committed while the defendant was intoxicated. Possession of narcotics,
on the other hand, may take place when the addict is not intoxicated.
Such an argument apparently overlooks two factors. First, Driver's
drunkenness while appearing in public was not the factor which made his
punishment unconstitutional. Rather, Driver's inability to control his
drunkenness so as to prevent his intoxication when appearing in public
was the controlling factor in reversing his conviction."' Public drunken-
ness is a valid criminal law, but the court held that it can not be applied to
alcoholics who are unable to control their drunkenness (as opposed to
being unable to control conduct because intoxicated)."' Secondly, to
assert that possession may occur when one is not under the influence of
drugs (drug intoxication) and that, in such situations, possession is
controlled, rational behavior overlooks the basic nature of narcotics
addiction. The addict's whole life is centered around the compulsion for
drugs. Any activity which is directly related to addiction can hardly be
deemed rational or voluntary.'56
If the Driver reasoning is extended to possession by an addict, a diffi-
cult question of "line drawing" is presented. One might argue that larceny
to obtain money for drugs might be considered an act which is compulsive
because of the disease of narcotics addiction. How can a court draw a line
between the possession of drugs and burglary, robbery or even murder to
obtain money for drugs? Not only would it be difficult to make such
determinations, but also there seems to be no criterion to draw such a
distinction.
An answer to this problem, it is submitted, is twofold. First, the
court's function is to draw fine lines. The clear cases present little problem
or need for judicial determination while fine distinctions need to be
determined to protect both society and the individual. Difficulty in
making these distinctions should be of no consequence. Secondly, a
153. See note 48 supra.
154. 356 F.2d at 765.
155. Id.
156. See notes 19-23 supra.
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criterion does exist for making a determination as to which crimes should
be punishable. This criterion as set forth in Driver is that "an act compul-
sive as symptomatic of a disease" is not punishable.1 The language of
the case indicates that "symptomatic" means a characteristic of the
disease.158 A characteristic of the disease of alcoholism is, of course,
drunkenness. The phrase an "act compulsive... ." includes any act which
is compelled, involuntary, or irresistable because of a characteristic of the
disease. Thus public drunkenness is an act which is compulsive because of
a characteristic of the disease. Likewise possession of narcotics is com-
pulsive because of a characteristic of the diesase(use of drugs). Burglary,
robbery, murder, etc. are not compulsive because of the use of drugs
(a characteristic of the disease).
CONCLUSION
An addict cannot control his possession of drugs any more than he
can control his addiction. The compulsion is so strong that the addict
must have the drug to maintain his disease. This compulsion renders all
other motivations subservient."'9 Clearly, possession of drugs under
these circumstances is compulsive as symptomatic of the disease of
addiction. It is therefore submitted that, applying the "complusion as
symptomatic" reasoning imposition of punishment for possession of
narcotics by an addict for personal consumption constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment.
157. 356 F.2d at 764.
158. Id.
159. See notes 19-23 supra. Two studies seem to support such a conclusion See
Raskin, supra note 12; Valiant & Rasor, The Role of Compulsory Supervision in the
Treatment of Addiction, 30 FED. PROB. 53 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Valiant]. The
Raskin study concerned an attempt in Detroit, Michigan, to establish a voluntary treat-
ment clinic for addicts. All persons who contacted the clinic had to undergo complete
physical withdrawal before the rehabilitative facilities were made available. Raskin,
supra note, 12, at 4. However, after receiving treatment for physical withdrawal, 80 per
cent did not return to the clinic unless they had relapsed into a state of addiction. The
sponsors of the clinic admitted the failure of the voluntary program and indicated that an
organized community effort was necessary to aid the addict. They recommended a three-
fold program. First, a legal framework for compulsory commitment. Secondly, a system
of rehabilitation hospitals created to effect physical withdrawal, initiate a long term pro-
gram for medical psychotherapeutic care, and institute a "reorganization of attitudes, con-
cepts, and abilities of social and community responsibilities." Lastly, a program of out-
patient clinics aimed toward adjustment without the use of drugs, Id. at 14-15.
The second study was initiated by the United States Public Health Hospital in
Lexington, Kentucky. The chief findings of the follow-up study of patients released
from Lexington after receiving treatment for drug addiction was that 90 per cent
relapsed to the daily use of drugs. Valiant 54-55. The study concluded that "compulsory
community supervision is strongly associated with abstinence among urban addicts." Id.
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